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Abstract
Background: Electronic medical records contain information of value for research, but contain identifiable and
often highly sensitive confidential information. Patient-identifiable information cannot in general be shared outside
clinical care teams without explicit consent, but anonymisation/de-identification allows research uses of clinical data
without explicit consent.
Results: This article presents CRATE (Clinical Records Anonymisation and Text Extraction), an open-source software
system with separable functions: (1) it anonymises or de-identifies arbitrary relational databases, with sensitivity and
precision similar to previous comparable systems; (2) it uses public secure cryptographic methods to map patient
identifiers to research identifiers (pseudonyms); (3) it connects relational databases to external tools for natural
language processing; (4) it provides a web front end for research and administrative functions; and (5) it supports a
specific model through which patients may consent to be contacted about research.
Conclusions: Creation and management of a research database from sensitive clinical records with secure
pseudonym generation, full-text indexing, and a consent-to-contact process is possible and practical using entirely
free and open-source software.
Keywords: Anonymisation, De-identification, Clinical informatics, Electronic medical records, Open-source software,
Pseudonymisation, Psychiatry
Background
Electronic medical records (EMRs) have considerable
value for medical research. However, full EMRs identify
patients completely and often contain highly sensitive
confidential information. A key principle of information
security is that patient-identifiable information should
not be shared outside the clinical care-giving team
without explicit consent, outside certain exceptional
circumstances [1–3]. Anonymisation or de-identification
allows researchers to be given access to material derived
from identifiable clinical records, without explicit
consent. This approach is endorsed and promised by the
UK National Health Service (NHS) Constitution for
England [4, 5] and has been used with success, including
in psychiatry [6].
The terms “anonymisation” and “de-identification” are
sometimes used interchangeably [7–9]; alternatively,
“anonymisation” is used in a stronger sense to denote an
irreversible form of de-identification [9]. De-identification
carries several technical challenges [10]. In a simple struc-
tured database, such as a haematology database storing
full blood count results, the bulk of de-identification may
be accomplished simply by omitting key identifiers (such
as names, dates of birth, and hospital numbers). However,
in many databases, much valuable information may be in
free text — notes, letters, and other documents — rather
than in structured fields. This is a common feature of clin-
ical records in psychiatry. The value in such data may be
to a human reading the de-identified text directly, or
through the creation of structured data from free text
using natural language processing (NLP) software. De-
Correspondence: rudolf@pobox.com
1Behavioural and Clinical Neuroscience Institute, Department of Psychiatry,
University of Cambridge, Sir William Hardy Building, Downing Site,
Cambridge CB2 3EB, UK
2Cambridgeshire & Peterborough NHS Foundation Trust and Cambridge
University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, Liaison Psychiatry Service, Box
190, Cambridge Biomedical Campus, Cambridge CB2 0QQ, UK
© The Author(s). 2017 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Cardinal BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making  (2017) 17:50 
DOI 10.1186/s12911-017-0437-1
identifying free text is more complex [6, 11, 12]. Finally, it
is usually required that multiple records from the same
patient are identified as being related in the de-identified
database. This requires a mechanism for creating a
patient-specific research identifier in a manner that does
not violate the security of de-identification, and often in a
way that patient identity can be looked up by administra-
tors (so-called pseudonymised information [2]); these are
problems of cryptography.
Existing tools for de-identification exist, using replace-
ment rules and/or machine learning. However, some are
not open-source [13], while many open-source tools are
tailored to specific types of source record [12, 14], rather
than embedding de-identification in a system for pro-
cessing arbitrary relational databases. Large-scale EMRs
often employ relational databases, so practical solutions
to the problem of large-scale EMR de-identification need
to manage the interface to such databases. Many de-
identification systems do not address in full the crypto-
graphic problem of pseudonym generation that accom-
panies de-identification in practice [13]. Some systems
de-identify structured information in relational databases
but do not de-identify free text [15]. Here I present an
open-source system enabling the de-identification of ar-
bitrary relational databases, with a particular focus on
the application of de-identifying EMRs in psychiatry. To
my knowledge, its novel contribution is the de-
identification of both structured data and free text
directly from one relational database to another, with
pseudonym generation based on established crypto-
graphic methods, in open-source software. In addition, it
supports other aspects of the overall management of a
secure research database, including the application of
NLP tools directly to relational databases, researcher
access, and a consent-for-contact process.
Implementation
CRATE (Clinical Records Anonymisation and Text
Extraction) comprises tools for anonymising or de-
identifying relational databases, a system for applying
NLP tools to relational databases, a web front end for
accessing the resulting research database, and a web
front end for implementing a specific consent-for-
contact model through which patients may be
approached about research participation directly or via
their clinicians (Fig. 1). It is intended as a toolchain
covering all steps from a clinical relational database con-
taining patient-identifiable data to a de-identified
research relational database, with structured information
from NLP tools added. In what follows, the term “source
database” will be used to refer to the original EMR, or a
copy thereof, which contains identifiable information,
and “destination database” refers to the de-identified
database created by CRATE.
The system aims to de-identify free text using infor-
mation present in the source database, by suppressing
direct identifiers and, optionally, reducing detail for
indirect identifiers [8]. Typically, identifying information
includes names, dates of birth, hospital numbers,
address components, telephone numbers, e-mail ad-
dresses, aliases, and names of family members or other
non-professional contacts [8].
The design follows that of the CRIS de-identifier [6, 13],
but with improvements in the handling of database struc-
ture, reliance only on open-source technologies, and a dif-
ferent set of de-identification and pseudonym algorithms.
Unlike CRIS, CRATE operates purely with relational data-
bases, without an intervening XML step. CRATE can
therefore perform patient-independent processing, such as
copying system lookup tables (reducing data pre-
processing requirements compared to CRIS), and handles
database NULL values, which indicate the absence of a
value, without modification (obviating the need to handle
“dummy” values such as 1 January 1900 to indicate an ab-
sent date). CRATE itself is free and open-source software
(FOSS) and relies only on FOSS, including for full-text
indexing to support rapid searches for words in a corpus
of text. It has extensible de-identification features, includ-
ing automatic handling of typographical errors (described
below). It uses published secure cryptographic methods
for mapping patient identifiers (PIDs) to research pseudo-
nyms (here termed research identifiers, RIDs), such that
disclosure to approved users of individual PID/RID pairs
does not compromise the security of the system as a
whole. CRATE supports pseudonymisation, but the stor-
age of pseudonyms in the destination database can be sup-
pressed, if anonymisation (in the sense of irreversible
removal of identifying material) is desired.
Open-source software components
All components of the system are FOSS or rely on third-
party FOSS tools. The CRATE system itself is written in
Python [16] with some Java [17]. As a Python program it
is cross-platform; it has been tested under 64-bit Ubuntu
Linux 14.04 and higher [18, 19] and 64-bit Windows 10
[20] and Windows 2008 Server.
Database access for de-identification and NLP is sup-
ported via the SQLAlchemy library [21], which supports
multiple database back-ends. CRATE has been tested
with Microsoft SQL Server, MySQL, and PostgreSQL.
NLP is supported via GATE [22], MedEx-UIMA [23],
and Python regular expressions, and can be extended to
other NLP frameworks.
The web site components of CRATE use an industry-
standard FOSS stack. Under Linux, this includes the
Django web framework [24], Gunicorn as the back-end
web server [25], a front-end web server such as Apache
[26] to provide secure hypertext transfer protocol access
Cardinal BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making  (2017) 17:50 Page 2 of 12
(HTTPS, via secure sockets layer, SSL), the supervisord
task control program [27], and the Celery distributed
task queue [28] using the RabbitMQ messaging system
[29]. Under Windows, Gunicorn is replaced with
CherryPy [30], which can also serve as a front-end web
server providing HTTPS/SSL if required, and supervi-
sord is replaced by a custom Windows service.
Preliminary database processing
Only minimal data pre-processing is necessary. The
computer(s) running CRATE should be able to “see” all
databases containing the source data, locally or over a
fast secure network. The source database should be a
copy of the original clinical database with read-only
access, not the “live” copy, so that its contents do not
change during the anonymisation/de-identification
process. Every table containing patient-identifiable infor-
mation must have a column containing the database-
wide patient identification number (PID), such as a local
institutional identifier. If this is not true of the original
clinical database, views should be created to add this
information to existing tables.
Fig. 1 Overview of the roles that CRATE can play in the creation of a research database. The figure shows a schematic of a full EMR containing
sensitive and identifiable information, its processing into a pseudonymised research database, and methods through which researchers may use
the research database to contact patients about research, while preserving anonymity for those who have not consented to be contacted. Key
functions of CRATE are shown, as follows. a Anonymisation of source data in a relational database framework, using identifiers in the source data
to “scrub” free text. In this example the date of birth has also been partially obscured. b Generation of crypographically secure research IDs using
hashed message authentication codes and one-time pads. An integer transient research ID is illustrated; full research IDs use longer hexadecimal
digests. c Provision of a managed relational database interface to natural language processing tools such as GATE. d Provision of an optional web
front end to a research database. e Management of a consent-to-contact process. The anonymisation, NLP, front end, and consent-to-contact
components are modular and usable separately
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The host institution may choose to add additional infor-
mation to the source database(s) prior to de-identification.
However, linking of multiple clinical databases prior to
de-identification is unnecessary so long as those databases
all contain a suitable common identifier (such as an NHS
number), as these identifiers can be encoded in a way that
allows several de-identified databases to be linked subse-
quently, via methods described below.
The software proceeds according to the instructions in
a data dictionary, a file in tab-separated value (TSV) for-
mat containing one row for each column in the source
database(s). Data dictionaries may be automatically gen-
erated from a source database, following a configurable
process, but must be subject to human inspection before
use, and normally require some customization.
Anonymisation/de-identification methods
Relational databases are composed of tables having col-
umns (fields) and rows (records). The CRATE system is
designed to copy and de-identify arbitrary relational
databases, with the caveat that any table requiring de-
identification must have a column containing a
database-wide patient identification number (PID). If the
source database does not meet that constraint, a
pseudo-column containing the PID must be added (for
example, by creating views on existing tables). Tables
not requiring anonymisation/de-identification, such as
system lookup tables that do not contain patient-specific
information, may be copied unchanged.
The data dictionary defines column names and struc-
tured query language (SQL) data types for the source and
destination databases, and permits the renaming of col-
umns in the process. It also defines special flags to control
de-identification, as follows. Fields can be marked as con-
taining sensitive information suitable for scrubbing with,
so-called scrub-source fields. An example would be a
structured field containing a patient’s forename, or an-
other containing their date of birth. Alternatively, fields
can be marked as text that may contain patient informa-
tion and/or third-party information (relating to other
people, such as the patient’s family, and usually excepting
healthcare professionals [13]), so-called sensitive free text
fields. As de-identification proceeds, the sensitive text is
replaced (masked) by a customisable value, such as “[___]”
for patient information and “[…]” for third-party informa-
tion. The administrator may choose which information to
scrub with, according to their specific de-identification re-
quirements [8] — for example, information about a
patient’s school might be weakly or strongly identifying,
depending on the number of other patients sharing such a
characteristic [8], might be important or unimportant for
specific research reasons, and preservation or removal of
such information might be required under local ethics and
information governance rules, or applicable national regu-
lations [8, 31].
Scrubbing is performed by regular expressions
(regexes) [32]. For any individual scrub-source field, the
software creates a custom regular expression for scrub-
bing, according to the administrator’s instructions
regarding the type of information stored in that field.
The following broad methods are defined. (All examples
below are fictional and any resemblance to real persons
is entirely coincidental.)
 Scrub as words. A source string (text from a
scrub-source field in the source database) is split into
chunks using all non-alphanumeric characters as
boundaries, and each chunk is used for scrubbing.
Thus, a scrub-source field containing “John Al’Rahem”
will scrub all instances of “John”, “Al”, or “Rahem”
from all sensitive free-text fields relating to that
patient.
◦ Safe (whitelisted) words may be configured, to
omit them from scrubbing (typically, short words
such as “a”, “of ”, “the”, or “street” that may appear
in patient initials or addresses but do not have to
be excised from text).
◦ Default suffixes may be applied for scrubbing,
such as the suffix “s”, permitting de-identification
if “Robert’s” is misspelled “Roberts”.
◦ For more conservative scrubbing, up to a certain
number of typographical errors (character
insertions, deletions, or substitutions) may be
permitted (using the fuzzy-matching feature of
Python’s regex module [33]). With this method, if
“Jakob” is misspelled “Jacob”, the error will still be
scrubbed.
◦ A minimum word length may be set for
typographical errors to apply. The default value is
4. Without this option, for example, a patient
name of “Ian” might remove all instances of
“in” — an inconvenience, but also a clue to the
name if the word “in” could be inferred from
surrounding text.
◦ A minimum string length may be set for
scrubbing as well. If this is at its lowest and most
conservative value of 1, then the address “4 Privet
Drive” would scrub the “4” from phrases such “last
episode 4–5 years ago” as well as from the
address. The default value is 2.
 Scrub as a phrase. In this more restrictive text
scrubbing method, the word sequence is only
scrubbed if all words occur in order. Arbitrary
non-alphanumeric separators are allowed between
words. Whereas the “words” method is suited to
names, the “phrase” method is better suited to
addresses. It prevents, for example, “4 Privet Drive”
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from scrubbing dose information from “risperidone
4 mg/day”. The price is that it is less comprehensive
at scrubbing slightly incorrect address information
(e.g., “29 Acacia Avenue”, entered by mistake for “29
Acacia Road”, would be scrubbed to “[___] [___]
Avenue” by the “words” method, but not scrubbed
by the “phrase” method).
 Scrub as a number. A string or number from the
source database is first converted into a digit string;
for example “(01223) 123456” is converted to
“01223123456”. This digit string is then used to
scrub regardless of spacing or punctuation (thus a
scrub-source field containing “123 456” will scrub
the numbers from strings such as “M123456”,
“NHS#123456”, “123 456”, “(123) 456”, or “123456”).
 Scrub as an alphanumeric code. This method
operates as for numeric scrubbing, but allows any
sequence of alphanumeric characters to be
scrubbed, not just digits. This is effective for
postcodes (thus a scrub-source field containing
“CB12 3DE” will scrub “CB123DE”, “CB12-3DE”, and
so on). No other semantic rules are applied.
 Scrub as a date. Dates may be expressed in very
variable ways. The CRATE scrubber breaks dates into
their component parts of day, month, and year, allows
a wide variety of equivalents for each, and will deal
with a wide variety of formats. Thus a source date of 7
January 2013 can be used to scrub all of “07 Jan
2013”, “7 January 13”, “7/1/13”, “1/7/13”, “Jan 7 2013”,
“2013/01/07”, “2013-01-07”, “7th January 13”, “Jan 7th
13”, “07.01.13”, “7.1.2013”, “20130107T0123”,
“20130107”, or many other variations. Though dates
are scrubbed in a variety of formats, they are treated
as simple points in time, to remove potential
identifiers such as dates of birth, without using more
sophisticated temporal information extraction
methods [34]; this means that indirect or unusual
references to dates (such as “he was born on Easter
Day in 1950”) may be missed.
A significant weakness of this system is that the
software can only scrub information that is present in
the source database.
In addition, some categories of non-specific scrubber
can be configured. For example, the administrator can
require that all numbers of specified lengths be removed.
Specifying lengths of 10 and 11 would remove UK NHS
numbers and modern UK telephone numbers in full for-
mat, respectively, whether or not these are specified in
scrub-source fields. The potential price is, of course, the
removal of relevant but non-identifiable information in a
similar format. UK postcodes can also be scrubbed in
non-specific fashion. Non-specifically scrubbed informa-
tion is replaced by a third distinct place-holder, such as
“[~~~]”. Words can be blacklisted (always removed) or
whitelisted (never removed). Other than for blacklisted/
whitelisted words, dictionary methods are not used.
Examples of these regular expressions are shown in
Table 1. Scrubbers are applied in the general order: (1)
nonspecific scrubbers, (2) patient scrubbers, and (3)
third-party scrubbers. Within the latter two categories,
individual scrubbers are applied in sequence in the order
specified by the data dictionary, which is configured by
the administrator.
All categories of scrubber can be configured to operate
at word boundaries only, or at any location within the
Table 1 Example regular expressions
Method Source information Example of case-insensitive regular expression(s) for scrubbing
Words John Al’Rahem ► \bJohn\b
►\bRahem\b
Phrase 4 Privet Drive ► \b4\W+Privet\W+Drive\b
Number (01223) 123456 ► (?< !\d)0\W*1\W*2\W*2\W*3\W*1\W*2\W*3\W*4\W*5\W*6(?!\d)
Alphanumeric code CB12 3DE ► \bC\W*B\W*1\W*2\W*3\W*D\W*E\b
Date 31 Dec 2016 ► 0*31(?:st|nd|rd|th)?\W*(?:0*12|Dec(?:ember)?)\W*(?:20)?16
► (?:0*12|Dec(?:ember)?)\W*0*31(?:st|nd|rd|th)?\W*(?:20)?16
► (?:20)?16\W*(?:0*12|Dec(?:ember)?)\W*0*31(?:st|nd|rd|th)?
Nonspecific: 10-digit numbers – ► (?< !\d)[0-9][ \t]*[0-9][ \t]*[0-9][ \t]*[0-9][ \t]*[0-9][ \t]*[0-9][ \t]*[0-9]
[ \t]*[0-9][ \t]*[0-9][ \t]*[0-9](?!\d)
Nonspecific: UK postcodes – ► \b[A-Z][0-9]\s*[0-9][A-Z][A-Z]\b
► \b[A-Z][0-9][0-9]\s*[0-9][A-Z][A-Z]\b
► \b[A-Z][A-Z][0-9]\s*[0-9][A-Z][A-Z]\b
► \b[A-Z][A-Z][0-9][0-9]\s*[0-9][A-Z][A-Z]\b
► \b[A-Z][0-9][A-Z]\s*[0-9][A-Z][A-Z]\b
► \b[A-Z][A-Z][0-9][A-Z]\s*[0-9][A-Z][A-Z]\b
For the method specified in the first column, the de-identifying software will take individual instances of sensitive data, from scrub-source fields (an example is
shown in the second column), and generate regular expressions (third column) with which to scrub sensitive free-text fields. Examples are shown at their default
settings; all methods can be configured further (e.g., to allow typographical errors, set minimum word lengths for scrubbing, or to change boundary detection
conditions for the regular expressions), as described in the text. All source examples are fictional. Emphasis added for clarity
Cardinal BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making  (2017) 17:50 Page 5 of 12
source string. The latter is more conservative but can
potentially scrub too much permissible text. All regex
searches are case-insensitive.
Beyond the configuration options offered for the
scrubbers, the system can be altered or extended freely
as required by end users with programming experience,
using Python to create appropriate regular expressions
or other methods as desired.
One or more alteration methods can be specified for
each field. These include:
 omission of the field from the destination
(for unnecessary or sensitive information);
 scrubbing the field of sensitive information
(typically for sensitive free-text source fields);
 partially obscuring dates to the first of the month
(e.g., for patient date-of-birth fields, allowing
calculation of approximate age without exact dates
of birth [13]);
 treating the field contents as a filename or binary
large object (BLOB) document and extracting plain
text from the document (currently supported for
DOC, DOCM, DOCX, HTML, DOT, ODT, PDF,
RTF, XML, and plain text files), to assist in extracting
free text from binary files attached to the EMR, where
the EMR contains a reference to a file held elsewhere
on disk or contains the document as a BLOB;
 removal of HTML tags or escape sequences;
 skipping of individual rows based on inclusion or
exclusion values (e.g., to restrict to current versions of
records whose full editing history is present in a table).
Indexes, including full-text indexes (if supported), may
be added to the destination fields. Indexes greatly speed
up database queries when applied correctly, and full-text
indexes greatly speed up searching for keywords within
long passages of text (e.g., [35]).
The overall process of anonymisation/de-identification
(Fig. 1a) is therefore as follows:
 Non-patient tables are copied without scrubbing.
 A single non-specific scrubber is created.
 A column from a master table in the source
database that contains all possible PIDs is used to
generate each PID in turn.
 For each PID, the program works through all
scrub-source fields for that patient, generating one
agglomerated regex that describes all
patient-identifiable data, and a second regex for all
third-party data.
 For that patient, the program then works through
all rows from all tables, applying the scrubbers to
any sensitive free-text fields and applying any other
alterations.
An ability to opt out is often an important part of
overall information governance procedures. CRATE’s
opt-out list allows specific patients to be omitted
entirely, and wiped from the database if they were proc-
essed in a previous iteration. The opt-out list can be
managed manually from an administrative database
table, and/or from disk files, and/or from opt-out marker
fields in the source database.
Debugging options allow the de-identification of small
quantities of data to tune the data dictionary and de-
identification parameters appropriately to the institu-
tion’s source data prior to a full run. A further tool
allows a sample set of raw and de-identified documents
to be extracted for human before-and-after comparison
with a text comparison tool such as Meld [36].
Multiple databases
Multiple databases can be copied and de-identified
jointly, if they share a common PID. In this situation,
information held in one database can be used to de-
identify information held in the other database, and vice
versa, by creating a common pool of sensitive informa-
tion with which to “scrub”.
If multiple databases do not share a common PID, so
that they must be de-identified separately, but neverthe-
less have an identifier in common (such as two partially
overlapping databases having different local numbering
systems but with NHS number information), that identi-
fier can be treated as a “master PID” (MPID) and hashed
consistently across the databases, allowing subsequent
linkage, as described below.
Translation from patient identifier to research identifier
The de-identified research database requires patient
identifier equivalents: RIDs (Fig. 1b). These distinguish
different patients, link tables in the research database,
and if desired can serve as the basis for re-identification
via a managed consent-to-contact process. Several prop-
erties should be satisfied by a good PID-to-RID mapping
system. (1) It is vital that the mapping be one-way, so
that researchers cannot generate the PID from the RID.
(2) The algorithm must be collision-resistant, so that no
two PIDs are mapped to the same RID. (3) It is desirable
that the algorithm be published, so that the source code
for the de-identifier contains no valuable algorithmic se-
crets, and so that users can be assured of its crypto-
graphic basis. (4) It is highly desirable that knowledge of
individual PID/RID pairs should not break the algo-
rithm. For example, if a clinician recognizes one of their
patients from the de-identified information (by virtue of
their additional clinical knowledge), or is deliberately
given a RID so that they may access additional analysed
data present in the research database, then they will be
aware of one or more PID/RID pairs. This should not
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allow them to calculate other PIDs from other RIDs. (5)
The RID should be of a relatively convenient length and
format for researchers to operate with. (6) It is desirable
but not always necessary that the mapping be reprodu-
cible, so that if the research database is destroyed it can
be regenerated without loss of consistency with previous
RIDs, and so that two databases can be de-identified
independently using a consistent PID-to-RID mapping
and then linked on RID.
The simplest method that satisfies criteria 1–5 is a
“one-time pad” method, such as choosing an unused
random number for each new PID. However, this is not
reproducible. A reproducible method requires a secret
key that is combined with the PID to produce the RID.
Simple cryptographic hash functions using the secret
key as a salt satisfy most of these criteria, but not neces-
sarily criterion 4. Since PIDs are typically simple, such as
an integer sequence (or in the case of NHS numbers, an
integer sequence with a checksum digit), it is possible
that knowledge of one PID/RID pair allows generation
of another [37]. An appropriate choice of algorithm that
also satisfies criterion 4 is a hashed message authentica-
tion code (HMAC) based on a cryptographically secure
hash function [37].
The CRATE system converts PIDs to string-form
hexadecimal digests of a hash. It allows use of HMAC-
MD5, which produces a short (32-character) digest;
MD5 is cryptographically flawed but HMAC-MD5 over-
comes its weaknesses, such that known collision attacks
on MD5 do not break HMAC-MD5 [37]. CRATE also
offers HMAC-SHA-256 and HMAC-SHA-512, which
produce 64- and 128-character digests respectively.
SHA-256 and SHA-512 are currently secure in their
own right [38].
The secret key is part of the institution’s configuration
of CRATE, not of the software itself. CRATE allows
separate keys to be specified for the PID (used for creat-
ing the RID) and the MPID (used for creating the master
research identifier, MRID). The use of a consistent secret
key allows multiple databases to be de-identified separ-
ately yet subsequently linked via the encrypted RID
equivalents. The mapping is stored in a separate secret
database, enabling reverse look-up.
Because 32- to 128-character digests can be inconveni-
ent for simple queries, the system also generates a transi-
ent integer research ID (TRID), using a “one-time pad”
system. TRIDs have a 1:1 mapping to RID, which is main-
tained across incremental database updates, but this 1:1
mapping is destroyed and regenerated when a full data-
base rebuild is performed. Because an auto-incrementing
integer might yield a predictable and therefore insecure
relationship between PID and RID, the TRID is generated
pseudorandomly (with a random or a pre-specified seed
for the random number generator). The TRID, therefore,
is convenient for within-query use (for efficient linkage of
different tables within the research database), and for that
reason is used as the primary key for tables containing
patient-identifiable information, but researchers should
use RIDs or MRIDs for any longer-term identification of
records — for example, if information must be preserved
across subsequent database rebuilds.
This method also allows for a variety of methods of
data linkage across sites [10]. Suppose institution A and
institution B have information that they wish to link,
and that linkage is possible because of a shared identi-
fier, such as an NHS number. Information governance
and data protection rules within the NHS will typically
prohibit A and B sharing identifiable information with-
out explicit consent. A traditional method in the UK to
permit research in this setting is for the institutions to
apply for an exemption to this rule under Section 251 of
the NHS Act 2006; to share and link the identifiable data
(and often a small subset of it) prior to anonymisation/
de-identification, either themselves or via a trusted third
party C; and then to make the resulting jointly anon-
ymised/de-identified data available to researchers with
strict controls relating to access to the data. The use of
appropriate cryptographic hashing allows, in principle,
alternative methods. For example, A and B can hash
their data independently, using a common method and
shared secret salt, and then share some of the de-identi-
fied data (limiting the transport of identifiable material),
which can be linked via the common hash. The salt used
for this sharing does not have to be the same as that
used by each institution for its routine internal work,
and access to any stored mappings between different
RIDs (generated using different salts) can be controlled
as required. Salt secrecy is important: if identifiers such
as NHS numbers are used as PIDs, it must be assumed
that knowledge of the salt allows RID to PID lookup by
brute-force hashing of all possible PIDs, since such PIDs
are from a restricted range (an NHS number is a 9-digit
number plus a tenth checksum digit, so there are fewer
than 109 possible NHS numbers).
Incremental updates
Incremental updates can be much faster than full database
runs, so CRATE supports incremental de-identification.
The source database may change in several pertinent
ways. New patients may be added to the source database;
new information may be added for existing patients; infor-
mation may be deleted; and aspects of confidential patient
data may change (for example, a new alias may be added
to the EMR for the patient by clinical or clinical adminis-
trative staff: William, known as Bill). The CRATE de-
identifier will handle incremental updates for any table
with a suitable primary key (PK) that can uniquely identify
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each row. Other tables are dropped from the destination
and recreated.
During de-identification, a hash is created for each
source row and stored in the destination database (un-
less the administrator guarantees that the contents will
not change), and similarly a hash of each patient’s scrub-
ber is kept in a secret database. Rows present in a des-
tination table but absent from the corresponding source
are deleted. For each patient, the scrubber is calculated;
if the scrubber’s hash differs from the stored version,
then confidential information has changed and all
destination records for that patient are reworked in full.
Finally, rows that have changed (as judged by hash) or
are new are processed.
Incremental updates are also supported for data
dictionary creation, though human intervention is
required to check data dictionaries.
Several database engines support hot-swapping of data-
bases (e.g., [39]). This allows a lengthy de-identification
process to run without disturbing the active research
database, followed by a brief swap to the new database.
Natural language processing system
NLP is supported via GATE [22], a general-purpose NLP
framework; MedEx-UIMA [23], a tool for identifying ref-
erences to medication; and Python-based regular expres-
sions. NLP is run as a separate step from de-identification.
Administrators can configure CRATE by defining one or
more NLP definitions. Each NLP definition specifies a set
of source fields (such as free-text progress notes, or fields
containing text extracted from clinical documents), an
NLP processor, and a set of output tables. Text from the
source fields is fed to the NLP processor, which produces
zero or more results, and into the output tables, along
with metadata such as details of the source table/record.
CRATE provides a mechanism to couple multiple NLP
tools into a relational database pipeline, and offers a
class framework for implementing regular-expression
NLP applications in Python. As GATE and MedEx-
UIMA are Java-based systems that run as standalone
processes, CRATE provides a system to encapsulate
them for use with relational databases (Fig. 1c): text
from the source fields is fed by CRATE’s Python-based
code, via a process pipe connection (with or without
temporary files, depending on the NLP tool’s require-
ments), to CRATE code written in Java, and thence to
the external application. Each CRATE process loads and
repeatedly reuses a single Java instance, as there is
substantial overhead associated with loading the Java
system. The external application processes the text. For
example, a default example GATE application detects
people’s names and cities within free text, and this would
return XML output marked with Person and Location
tags. CRATE sends these to a destination database,
adding cross-references to the source material. For ex-
ample, it might send Person information to a table con-
taining fields such as “firstname”, “surname”, and
“gender”. The output from different NLP tools can be
fed into different destination tables, which is typically
necessary to manage structural inconsistencies between
the output of different NLP tools, or desirable to com-
pare the performance of two different NLP tools having
the same aim.
The accuracy of NLP depends on the performance of
the specific external application (e.g., [23, 40]).
Incremental updates are supported in the same
manner as for de-identification. The CRATE system is
extensible to other NLP frameworks.
Researcher access to data and audit
The final database can be queried using raw SQL, allow-
ing researchers to use a variety of standard SQL tools
including statistical software, and full auditing.
CRATE also provides a web-based front end interface
to assist with visualization of the research database
structure and queries, with content highlighting and
auditing (Fig. 1d). It incorporates a simple SQL query
builder but also permits researchers to enter raw SQL
(requiring a read-only connection to the database for
security against malicious input).
Database administration functions and consent-to-contact
system
Further secure web-based interfaces are provided for
privileged functions, including reverse lookup of PIDs
from RIDs.
The system also provides a specific consent-to-contact
system (NHS Research Ethics reference 12/EE/0407). In
this system, patients may consent or refuse to be
contacted by researchers. When researchers submit a
contact request using a RID, this is either translated to
an approval notification containing the patient’s details
(if the patient has consented) or is electronically
rejected (if the patient has refused). An additional route,
which can be actively selected by patients but which also
operates as the default when patients have not been
asked about research preferences, is that the researcher’s
request is transmitted by institutional secure e-mail to
the patient’s clinician, who may pass the request on to
the patient or veto it (Fig. 1e). This approach satisfies
the general principle of “consent or anonymise”: if the
patient has previously consented, their identity can be
made available to approved researchers, but if not, the
first approach about research is from a member of their
clinical care team, and researchers can see only anon-
ymised data.
The consent-to-contact system is separable from the
de-identification and the NLP systems.
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Other technical, institutional security, and information
governance considerations
CRATE provides core de-identification functions, but
implementing a secure research database using sensitive
clinical data requires a good deal more that CRATE does
not attempt to address. Additional technical consider-
ations include restricting access to the research database
and web site to computers within the institution’s secure
network (± virtual private network) only; requiring that
connections from researchers to the database computer
use only encrypted HTTPS/SSL, even within the institu-
tion, to prevent “wire sniffing”; appropriate securing of
the computer against other forms of access (using fire-
walls and other aspects of operating system security);
and physical security, power protection, and backup sys-
tems for the hosting computer(s). Institutional and
cultural considerations include an appropriate informa-
tion governance framework, including information
governance training and suitable contractual and profes-
sional obligations upon users; an oversight framework;
Caldicott Guardian approval within the NHS, and appro-
priate engagement with all stakeholders [6].
Performance
Speed
Processing is parallelized. For de-identification, non-
patient tables containing an integer PK have their rows
distributed across multiple processes. Non-patient tables
without an integer PK are assigned wholesale to different
processes, as is the work of indexing. Patient tables have
their work distributed by integer PID across multiple
processes. For NLP, work is parallelized by integer PK.
The system is capable of parallel processing across a
cluster as well as on a multi-core machine, though a sin-
gle high-performance multi-core machine is typically
easier to manage.
Methods
De-identification speed was tested using a synthetic
database of 1.5 Gb containing 1000 fictional patients,
100 notes per patient, and 1000 random words per note.
The test computer was an 8-core × 3.5 GHz Intel
i7-3770 K processor running Linux with 16 Gb RAM
and SSD storage. All databases ran under MySQL; full-
text indexing was not enabled.
Results
De-identification was performed at 14.2 Mb/s. In single-
process profiling on a smaller similar test database of
100 patients, 51% of CPU time was spent in the core
regex substitution function and 27% in database query/
commit calls. An incremental update on an unchanged
database ran 3.3 times faster. For execution of GATE’s
demonstration “people and places” text recognition
application, text was processed at 0.18 Mb/s (with the
GATE framework being the primary consumer of CPU
time).
Accuracy of de-identification
Methods
For de-identification, a target was defined as a potential
identifier present in the source text; a non-target as any
other word in the source text; a positive response as
scrubbing the source word (masking it by replacing it
with a character sequence such as “[___]”); and a nega-
tive response as not masking it. A hit (true positive) was
defined as the correct masking of a target; a miss (false
negative) as a failure to mask a target; a false alarm
(false positive) as the unnecessary masking of a non-tar-
get; and a correct rejection (true negative) as non-mask-
ing of a non-target. Sensitivity = recall = true positive rate
was therefore defined as P(hit|target) = P(masked|identi-
fier), and precision = positive predictive value as P(hit|posi-
tive) = P(hit|hit or false alarm) = P(identifier|masked).
Known identifiers were defined as identifiers marked as
such in the source data; and unknown identifiers as those
identifiers present in free-text fields but not marked as
identifiers in the source data (e.g., aliases or family mem-
ber names not recorded in structured form in the source
database, which the anonymiser does not know about and
therefore cannot mask, or where records were misfiled
against the wrong patient) [13]. All identifiers encompass
both known and unknown identifiers.
Identifiers were defined very liberally (including, for
example, a single initial). Defined this liberally, some
identifiers are intrinsically hard to mask with perfect
precision/recall (e.g., if someone’s initial is a word such
as “A” or “I”). Where an identifier was at times relevant
for removal and at other times not (e.g., “Peterborough”
occurring as part of a patient’s address and therefore
being masked from part of a clinic or general practi-
tioner address), the context was used by a human to
determine if removal was necessary, thus providing a
strict criterion against which to evaluate the algorithm.
Precision deviated from 100% because of overlap be-
tween identifying and non-identifying information. For
known identifiers, recall deviated from 100% only when
spelling errors exceed the configured threshold (an ad-
justable parameter). The difference in recall between
known identifiers and all identifiers, obviously, reflects a
lack of coding of identifiers within the source data.
For scoring, words were counted in the conven-
tional fashion for source data, and where masking
occurred, a single mask was considered to be a single
word in the results.
Settings common to all conditions Source material
forming part of the Cambridgeshire and Peterborough
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NHS Foundation Trust (CPFT) Research Database
(Research Ethics reference 12/EE/0407) was used. One
clinical document was sampled from each of 100 distinct
patients to evaluate performance (yielding 50,274
words). The identifiers available for scrubbing included:
CPFT patient identification numbers; NHS numbers;
names (including recorded aliases); dates of birth; ad-
dresses; e-mail addresses; telephone numbers; UK
National Insurance numbers; and family members’/
carers’ names, dates of birth, addresses, e-mail addresses,
and telephone numbers. Not all of this information was
available for all patients. De-identification was per-
formed with the following settings: default string suffix
“s”; up to 1 typographical error detected; typographical
error detection applied to scrub-source strings of 4 char-
acters or more; a minimum string length of 1 for scrub-
source text strings; no non-specific scrubbing; scrubbing
of codes, dates, and strings at word boundaries but
scrubbing of numbers at any location within the source
string (regardless of word boundaries). A short whitelist
was used: am, an, as, at, bd, by, he, if, is, it, me, mg, od,
of, on, or, re, so, to, us, we, her, him, tds, she, the, you,
road, street. De-identification was then tested using an
“untuned” configuration and then progressively refined,
applying a total of three different configurations of the
software to the same text corpus, in an attempt to
improve precision by reducing the false-alarm rate.
Condition 1 In this condition, the most stringent, town
and county information was considered identifying (des-
pite this being unrealistic). No geographical locations
were whitelisted. Addresses were anonymised using the
“words” method.
Condition 2 In this more realistic condition, town and
county information was considered non-identifying. The
commonest parts of local institutional addresses were
whitelisted (Cambridge, Peterborough, Huntingdon,
Cambs, Cambridgeshire).
Condition 3 Settings were as for Condition 2, except (a)
whitelist terms were added relating to further geograph-
ical areas containing service sites of CPFT or its partners
(Fulbourn, Wisbech, Ely, Saffron Walden, Essex,
Norwich, Norfolk) or non-identifying towns causing fre-
quent false alarms (March, a town that often appears in
dates), and (b) addresses were anonymised as phrases
rather than words.
Results
Results are shown in Table 2. Tuning the software to be
aware of relevant local geographic locations reduced the
false-alarm rate (from Condition 1 through to Condition 3).
The software detected and masked all identifiers present in
the source database, except for one miss in Condition 1
that was due to an address being mis-spelled with 2
typographical errors (1 above the software’s threshold). The
results illustrate the principal weakness of this de-
identification method: that, when considering all identifiers,
misses occured because the identifying information was not
recorded in structured form in the source database. Such
“unknown” identifiers were primarily nicknames, and
names of friends or family members. Misses were occasion-
ally due to a document being misfiled in the wrong patient’s
record. (The decrease in all-identifier sensitivity seen in
Condition 3 was due to partially incorrect addresses, not
present in the source, but matched in part using subset in-
formation in the previous conditions; e.g., “29 Acacia Road”
marked as an identifier but entered in error as “29 Acacia
Avenue” in the free text.)
Conclusions
This article presents an open-source cross-platform
package capable of de-identification of generic relational
databases, using public cryptographic methods for map-
ping patient identifiers to research IDs. The system is
suitable for source materials containing substantial
quantities of sensitive free text, such as electronic
clinical records in psychiatry.
Table 2 De-identification performance
Metric Condition
1
Condition
2
Condition
3
Number of words in source text
(n)
50,274 50,274 50,274
Hits 1,392 1,326 1,116
False alarms 275 132 25
For known identifiers (those recorded as structured information in the
source database):
Misses 1 0 0
Correct rejections 48,606 48,816 49,113
Sensitivity = recall 0.999 1 1
Precision 0.835 0.909 0.978
For all identifiers (including those not recorded as structured information in
the source database):
Misses 127 125 128
Correct rejections 48,480 48,691 49,005
Sensitivity = recall 0.916 0.914 0.897
Precision 0.835 0.909 0.978
Performance of the de-identifier on the same corpus of clinical documents,
with three different specimen configurations. The conditions differed in the
definition of “identifying information” used, in whitelisting of geographical
location, and in the method used for detecting fragments of addresses (see
text; these differences lead also to variation in the number of hits counted, for
example whether successful masking of an address such as “29 Acacia
Avenue” was counted as one hit, if masked to “[___]”, or several hits, if masked
to “[___] [___] [___]”). A miss was defined as any identifier appearing in the
destination text and identifiers were defined very liberally, including a single
initial, so appearance of a single identifier in the destination text does not
equate to identifying the patient concerned [13]
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The de-identification results, particularly from the
tuned state (sensitivity 1.0 and precision 0.978 for identi-
fiers recorded in structured form in the source database,
and sensitivity 0.897 and precision 0.978 for all identi-
fiers), are comparable to specimen performance for the
original CRIS de-identifier (sensitivity/recall 0.976 and
precision 0.988 in one sample data set, and sensitivity
0.885 and precision 1.000 in another) [13]. Exact figures
will depend on the data set used. Importantly, an
organization can choose its own balance of sensitivity
and precision for its own ends through appropriate con-
figuration. A significant weakness of the system is that it
relies on the presence of identifying information in the
source database to de-identify free text. The use of an
open-source system and public cryptographic algorithms
allows others to manipulate the software freely, enabling
other de-identification techniques [11, 12] to be brought
into the system if required.
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